

Qaida with training in poisons and gases. For instance, in a speech on October 2002, the President said, "We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaida members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases."

In February, 2003, the President said, "Iraq has also provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training."

In March of 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said there was a "very strong link to training al-Qaida in chemical and biological weapons techniques, we know from a detainee that—the head of training for al-Qaida, that they sought help in developing chemical and biological weapons because they weren't doing very well on their own. They sought it in Iraq. They received the help."

Those statements were based on representations of Ibn al Shaykh al-Libi, a detained senior al-Qaida operative. But what the administration hid was the fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency did not believe al-Libi's statement. In February 2002, a year before the President claimed that Iraq "provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training," the DIA assessed that al-Libi "is more likely . . . intentionally misleading the debriefers."

Nor did the administration disclose a second DIA assessment in February of 2002 that said, "Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Ladin any useful CB knowledge or assistance," or DIA's April 2000 assessment that there was no credible reporting on al-Qaida training "anywhere" in Iraq.

The administration's statements also flew in the face of the CIA's January 2003 assessment that al-Libi was not in a position to know whether training had taken place.

So here is what we have. The President still says that Saddam had a relationship with Zarqawi. The Senate Intelligence Committee found that the intelligence community, in 2005, concluded that "the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye towards Zarqawi."

The President said that Saddam and al Qaida were "allies." The intelligence community found that intelligence shows that Saddam Hussein "viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime," and, indeed, as postwar intelligence shows, he, Saddam, "refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or operational support."

The Vice President called the claim that lead hijacker Mohammed Atta met with the Iraqi intelligence officer "credible" and "pretty much confirmed," but the Intelligence Committee report finds that the intelligence shows "no such meeting occurred."

The President said that Iraq provided training in poisons and gases to al-Qaida, but the Intelligence Committee finds that postwar intelligence supports prewar assessments that there was no credible reporting on al-Qaida

training "anywhere" in Iraq and that the terrorist who made the claim of training was "likely intentionally misleading his debriefers" when he said that Iraq had provided poisons and gases training.

But the administration's efforts to create the false impression that Iraq and al-Qaida were linked didn't stop with just statements. One of the most significant disclosures of the Intelligence Committee report is the account of the administration's successful efforts to obtain the support of CIA Director George Tenet to help them make that false case. The events were of major significance. They go to the heart of the administration's case for war on the eve of a congressional vote on whether to authorize that war. Here is what happened.

On October 7, 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, the President represented that linkage existed between Saddam and terrorist groups. He said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or an individual terrorist."

But on that very day, October 7, 2002, in a letter to Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, the CIA declassified at the request of the committee the CIA assessment that it would be an "extreme step" for Saddam Hussein to assist Islamic terrorists in conducting a weapons-of-mass-destruction attack against the United States and that the likelihood of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction if he did not feel threatened by an attack was "low."

When made public, the CIA assessment would have undercut the President's case. Something had to be done. So on October 8, 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, issued a statement that "there is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's growing threat and the view expressed by the President in his speech."

The Tenet statement was aimed at damage control and it undercut the CIA's own crucial assessment at a critical moment. The New York Times quoted Tenet prominently in a major story on October 9.

We called Tenet before the Intelligence Committee a month and a half ago, on July 26, 2006. In his testimony, quoted in the Intelligence Committee's report, Mr. Tenet admitted that perhaps there was an inconsistency between the President's statement and the CIA's assessment. Mr. Tenet said he issued his statement denying the inconsistency after policymakers expressed concern about the CIA's assessment, as expressed in the declassified October 7 letter. Again, that letter saying that it would be an extreme step for Saddam to assist Islamic terrorists in conducting a weapons-of-mass destruction attack.

I ask for an additional 3 minutes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Tenet admitted to the intelligence subcommittee that the policymakers wanted him to "say something about not being inconsistent with what the President had said." Tenet complied.

Tenet acknowledged to the committee, in his July 26, 2006, testimony, that issuing the statement was "the wrong thing to do."

It was much more than that. It was a shocking abdication of a CIA Director's duty not to act as a shill for any administration or its policies. Director Tenet issued that statement at the behest of the administration on the eve of the Congress's debate on the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. The use of the Director of Central Intelligence by the administration to contradict his own agency's assessment in order to support a policy goal of the administration is reprehensible, and it seriously damaged the credibility of the CIA.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair for its indulgence and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?

#### RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

There being no objection, at 12:42 p.m., the Senate recessed subject to the call of the Chair and reassembled at 1:14 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. ALLEN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I apologize for keeping you and the staff longer than you should have been, but I was unable to be here until just now. So thank you all very much for waiting for me.

#### SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. REID. Mr. President, at noon today, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report that proved evidence of two things: first, the Bush administration's case for war in Iraq was fundamentally misleading and deceptive and not supported by the underlying intelligence; second, the Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee continues to put the political interests of the Bush White House ahead of the security of the American people.

According to today's report, the Bush administration desperately sought to prove a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden in order to shore up public assertions being made by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior administration officials. But from this report which was made public today, at noon, we know these assertions directly contradicted the best assessments of our intelligence experts. In